Offline attacks on passwords are increasingly commonplace and dangerous. An offline adversary is limited only by the amount of computational resources he or she is willing to invest to crack a user's password. The danger is compounded by the existence of authentication servers who fail to adopt proper password storage practices like key-stretching. Password managers can help mitigate these risks by adopting key stretching procedures like hash iteration or memory hard functions to derive site specific passwords from the user's master password on the client-side. While key stretching can reduce the offline adversary's success rate, these procedures also increase computational costs for a legitimate user. Motivated by the observation that most of the password guesses of the offline adversary will be incorrect, we propose a client side cost asymmetric secure hashing scheme (Client-CASH). Client-CASH randomizes the runtime of client-side key stretching procedure in a way that the expected computational cost of our key derivation function is greater when run with an incorrect master password. We make several contributions. First, we show how to introduce randomness into a client-side key stretching algorithms through the use of halting predicates which are selected randomly at the time of account creation. Second, we formalize the problem * of finding the optimal running time distribution subject to certain cost constraints for the client and certain security constrains on the halting predicates. Finally, we demonstrate that Client-CASH can reduce the adversary's success rate by up to 21%. These results demonstrate the promise of the Client-CASH mechanism.
INTRODUCTION
Passwords are often the primary entryway to access a user's confidential information on a website, and are thus a focus of attention for attackers. Offline attacks against passwords are particularly powerful. An offline adversary has access to the cryptographic hash of a user's password and can check a vast number of password possibilities without interacting with the authentication server. This adversary is only restricted by the computational resources that he is willing to invest into breaching each account. Offline attacks are increasingly commonplace due to recent high-profile security breaches at organizations like LinkedIN, Sony, eBay, and Ashley Madison 1 .
Several factors contribute to the danger of offline attacks. First, users struggle to remember high entropy passwords for multiple accounts. Second, many organizations had failed to implement proper password storage techniques at the time they were breached. Finally, password cracking resources (e.g., hardware and password dictionaries) continue to improve allowing an adversary to mount cheaper and more effective attacks.
Client-side password management tools (e.g., PwdHash [35] ) allow the user to generate multiple passwords from one master password and apply secure procedures like key stretching or salting on the client-side. While password managers offer many benefits they also introduce a single point of failure (i.e., the master password) through which the adversary could attack to gain access to all of a user's accounts. A user's master password is not necessarily immune to offline attacks just because a password manager is used. The recent breach of LastPass 2 highlights this dangerous possibility. Thus, key stretching procedures (e.g., hash iteration, memory hard functions) are recommended to mitigate security risks in the event of an offline attack. However, keystretching increases costs for the honest party as well as the adversary. It is thus desirable to make authentication costs asymmetric so that (on average) a user authenticating with a correct password will incur lower costs than an offline adversary attempting to check an incorrect password guess. Previous work by Manber [27] and by Blocki and Datta [4] achieves this goal of cost-asymmetric key-stretching, but these solutions are only appropriate for server-side key stretching (see discussion in Section 2).
Contributions.
In this work we present Client-CASH a client-side keystretching algorithm which achieves the goal of asymmetric costs, and we demonstrate that this system can protect user passwords from offline attacks. The core idea behind Client-CASH is to randomize the runtime of the client-side key stretching so that on average, the cost of verifying a correct password is smaller than the cost of rejecting an incorrect password. This is achieved by the use of halting predicates P : {0, 1} * → {0, 1}, which tells us when to stop hashing the password (e.g., stop after t rounds of hash iteration if P (H t (pwd)) = 1). These halting predicates are chosen randomly at the time of account creation and are stored by the client (e.g., on a local computer or on the cloud).
Because these halting predicates are stored by the client we must take care to ensure that the predicates themselves do not leak too much information about the user's password. The key challenge is to select the predicates in a way that satisfies two seemingly conflicting requirements: 1) the halting predicates should induce a cost-asymmetry in the validation of correct/incorrect passwords, and 2) the adversary should not be able learn much about any user's master password even if he observes these halting predicates. We borrow ideas from differential privacy [19, 29] to satisfy both of these conflicting requirements.
We formalize the properties of Client-CASH and give an example of a system that satisfies these properties based on the Exponential Mechanism [29] , a powerful tool in differentially private analysis. We additionally formalize the problem of minimizing the percentage of passwords cracked by the adversary as an optimization over the parameters of the system and show that it can be solved efficiently as a linear program. In this work we analyze the security of Client-CASH systems that use up to two iterations of an underlying hash function H k for password key stretching (the tworound case) or up to three iterations of H k for key stretching (the three-round case). Here, the parameter k specifies the cost of the underlying hash function (e.g., BCRYPT [33] uses hash iteration to control costs and SCRYPT [31] uses a memory hard function to control costs). If we let Pr[E i,pwd ] denote the probability that Client-CASH terminates after the i'th round given the correct password pwd as input then the expected cost to verify a correct password guess is
We compare Client-CASH to deterministic key-stretching techniques H k with equivalent costs k = k i i · Pr[E i,pwd ] to Client-CASH by looking at the probability that an offline adversary with a finite computational budget B could crack the user's password -we use P adv,B (resp. P det,B ) to denote the adversary's success rate against Client-CASH (resp. deterministic key-stretching). For the two-round case, we obtain a reduction P det,B − P adv,B in passwords breached of up to 12%, and up to 21% in the three round case. Although we only show results for 2 and 3 round systems, we formulate the essential groundwork for analysis of systems with more rounds. From the significant decreases in passwords breached from two round to three round systems, we might expect that introducing more rounds will decrease the number of passwords breached in an offline attack even further.
In our analysis we make no assumptions on the password storage practices of the authentication server. If the authentication server adopts techniques like key stretching and salting then this will only make the adversary's task harder. However, we do assume that we face an optimal offline adversary with a finite computational budget B, and that users choose passwords uniformly at random. Because the later assumption does not hold for general users we only recommend our solution to users who choose passwords (nearly) uniformly at random. However, we argue that this assumption is plausible for many of the security conscious users that would opt to use a client-side key stretching algorithm (finding Client-CASH distributions that are optimal for protecting non-uniform passwords is an important direction for future work).
Overview of Client-CASH.
When Alice creates an account on server W using the master password pwdA our client-side application first selects a sequence of halting predicates oW = (Pu 1 ,. . ., Pu n−1 ) using a randomized function SelPreds(pwdA). Afterwards our application sends the message (Alice, H) to the server where H = H S W (pwd A ) k (pwdA). Here, H k denotes a collision resistant hash function which costs k work units to compute one time, H i k denotes the hash function iterated i times and SW (pwdA) denotes the stopping time for password pwdA given by the halting predicates oW -that is the smallest number i ≥ 1 for which Pu i (H i k (pwdA)) = 1. During authentication, Alice recomputes the derived password H = H S W (pwd A ) k (pwdA), sends (Alice, H) to the server and gains access to her account. An incorrect password guess pg = pA would be rejected with high probability since H k is collision resistant.
RELATED WORK
Halting Puzzles. At a high level our use of halting predicates is similar to Boyen's [12] halting puzzles. In Boyen's solution the chosen halting predicate will never return 'halt' unless we run the key derivation function with the correct password so the key derivation algorithm never halts (or only halts after the maximum possible number of rounds). The key difference between our work and the work of Boyen [12] is that we carefully bound the amount of information that the chosen halting predicate(s) can leak about the user's password. Thus, unlike [12] , we can ensure that an adversary who only breaches the client will not be able to execute an offline attack against the user's password. Cost-Asymmetric Server-Side Key Stretching. Manber [27] proposed the use of hidden salt values (e.g., 'pepper') to make it more expensive to reject incorrect passwords. Blocki and Datta [4] refined this idea using game theoretic tools. While our work closely follows the work of Blocki and Datta [4] , we stress that neither work [4, 27] addresses the issue of client side key-stretching. In both of these schemes the authentication server selects a secret salt value t ∈ {1, . . . , m} (e.g., "pepper") and stores the cryptographic hash H(pwd, t) -the value t is not stored on the authentication server. An adversary would need to compute the hash function m times in total to reject an incorrect password, while the authentication server will need to compute it at most (m + 1)/2 times on average to verify a correct password guess because it can halt immediately after it finds the correct value of t. This approach is not suitable for client-side key-stretching because we would produce m different derived keys, but the client program would not know which one is correct -neither of these value t or H(pwd, t) should be stored on the client. Since we are performing keystretching on the client-side we need to ensure that the final derived password that is sent to the authentication server is consistent among different authentication sessions. Password Management Software. Password managers like PwdHash [35] allow the user to generate multiple passwords from one master password. PwdHash uses a public key-derivation function to (re)generate each of the user's passwords from a single master password. Since the keyderivation function is public an adversary who breaks into any of the third party authentication servers could still execute an offline attack against the user's master password. By contrast, password managers like KeePass [34] store an encrypted password vault on the client and are not necessarily vulnerable in the previous scenario because the adversary would not have the password vault. The vault, which contains all of the user's passwords, is encrypted with the user's master password. However, any adversary who breaks into the client and steals a copy of this vault could execute an offline attack against the user's master password. Commercial applications like LastPass rely on a trusted server to derive passwords from the user's master password. Unlike PwdHash and KeePass these commercial applications are typically not open source so it is not always possible for independent researchers to verify their security properties. In theory these password managers could be designed so that an adversary would need to break into multiple servers (e.g., at LinkedIn and LastPass) before he can mount an offline attack on the user's master password. However, the recent breach at LastPass 3 demonstrates that we cannot rule out this dangerous possibility. Similarly, Client-CASH is designed so that the adversary would need to breach both the client computer and a third party authentication server to mount an offline attack. Deterministic Key Stretching Techniques. Advances in computing hardware (e.g., GPUs [25] , ASiCs [17] ) make offline attacks increasingly dangerous. An offline adversary can often try millions of password guesses per second. Morris and Thompson [30] proposed the idea of key-stretching to make the hash function more expensive to evaluate so that an offline attack is more expensive for the adversary. Other defenses (e.g., distributing the storage/computation of cryptographic hash values so that an adversary who only breaches one server does not learn anything about the user's password [14] and [16] ) require multiple dedicated authentication servers. Finding good key-stretching techniques is an active area of research 4 . Hash iteration (e.g., PBKDF2 [24] , 3 See https://blog.lastpass.com/2015/06/ lastpass-security-notice.html/ (Retrieved 9/1/2015). 4 For example, the Password Hashing Competition (https: //password-hashing.net/index.html) was developed to encourage the development of alternative password hashing BCRYPT [33] ) alone is often viewed as an insufficient keystretching technique because an offline adversary can often significantly reduce costs by building customized hardware to evaluate the iterated hash function. While computational speeds may vary greatly between different devices, memory latency speeds are relatively consistent [18] . Thus, modern password hash functions like SCRYPT [31] or Argon2 [2] typically use memory hard functions [18] for key-stretching purposes. Our work is largely orthogonal to these lines of research. In particular, we stress that Client-CASH is compatible with both forms of key-stretching (hash iteration and memory hard functions). Password Alternatives. Although researchers have been working on alternatives to text-passwords (e.g., graphical passwords [23, 15, 1] or biometrics [9] ) text-passwords are likely to remain entrenched as the dominant form of authentication for many years [9] . While we focus on text passwords in this paper we stress that the applications of Client-CASH are not necessarily limited to text passwords. Client-side key stretching is a valuable primitive that could be used to protect any lower entropy secret whether that secret is a text password, a graphical password or a biometric signal.
DESCRIPTION OF THE MECHANISM
In this section we introduce the Client-CASH mechanism and describe the account creation and authentication protocols. In our presentation we will use H to denote a cryptographic hash function (e.g., SHA256 or Blake2b) and we will use CH to denote the cost of computing H one time. We will also use H k to denote a deterministic hash function that is k times more expensive to compute than H (i.e., CH k = k·CH ). This might be achieved by hash iteration [33, 24] or by the adoption of memory hard functions [31] . We also use P to denote the set of passwords a user can pick. Account Creation. When a user u creates an account a with a master password pwdu ∈ P Client-CASH will execute the following steps: First, the client will run a randomized algorithm SelPreds(pwdu) to obtain a sequence of n − 1 halting predicates ou = (Pu 1 , . . . , Pu n−1 ). Here, a halting predicate Pu : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} is simply a function that will tell us when to halt the key-derivation process. Second, the client will then store the tuple (a, u, su, ou), where su ← Unif {0, 1} L is a random L-bit salt value. The client will then run the algorithm Reproduce (described below) to derive the password for account a.
We intentionally omit the workings of SelPreds and treat it as a black box for now. However, we stress that outcome ou selected by the randomized algorithm SelPreds(pwdu) may depend both on the master password pwdu and on a security parameter which bounds the amount of information the outcome ou might leak about pwdu. In later sections we will show how to construct a randomized algorithm SelPreds which minimizes the adversary's success rate P adv,B subject to certain security and cost constraints. The account creation protocol is described formally in Algorithm 1. Authentication. When the user u attempts to access the account a with the password guess pwdg ∈ P, the client first locates the record (a, u, su, ou) on the client. Then we execute the algorithm Reproduce function to derive the schemes (e.g., [2, 22] ) Algorithm 1 Create Account (Client Side) Input: account name a, username u, password pwdu; random bit strings r1, r2 System Parameters:
Algorithm 2 Reproduce (Client Side) Input: account name a, username u, password pwdg key ← (u, a); value ← FindClientRecord(key) If value = ∅ then return "Account does not exist."
Here, we use S(pwd, o) to denote the implicitly defined stopping time for each password pwd ∈ P given the sequence o = (Pu 1 , . . . , Pu n−1 ) of halting predicates. Formally, S(pwd, o) = i if and only if (1) Pu i H i k (pwd, su) = 1 and Pu j H j k (pwd, su) = 0 for all j < i or (2) i = n and Pu j H j k (pwd, su) = 0 for all j < n, where n denotes the maximum possible rounds of hash iteration.
Thus, to compute H S(pwdg ,ou) k (pwdg, su) we initially compute H1 ← H k (pwdg, su) and check if Pu 1 (H1) = 1. If it is then we return the derived password H1. Otherwise, we compute H2 ← H k (H1) and return H2 if and only if Pu 2 (H1) = 1. This process is repeated until either Pu i (Hi) = 1 or i = n. The derived password is sent to the server to be accepted or rejected. Authentication is guaranteed when pwdg = pwdu and is very unlikely when pwdg = pwdu because H is collision resistant. The client-side algorithm Reproduce is presented formally as Algorithm 2. We note that, unlike the account creation process, the algorithm Reproduce is entirely deterministic. Remark. We omit any description of how the authentication server stores the derived password as this is an orthogonal issue. In an ideal world the authentication server would add salt and apply a strong key-stretching algorithm before storing the derived password. Unfortunately, many authentication servers have failed to adopt these standard security practices [10] . Furthermore, users will not necessarily know what security practices have been adopted until the authentication server is actually breached. Thus, in our security analysis we will assume that the authentication server does not do any key-stretching. By applying salting and keystretching algorithms on the client-side we can help protect users even when organizations fail to adopt these security practices. Of course if the authentication server does perform additional key stretching then the adversary's task will be even harder. Notation and Customizable Parameters We use B to denote the budget of the adversary (i.e., the maximum number of times the adversary is willing to evaluate H in an attempt to crack the user's password), and we will use Csrv to denote the maximum cost that the client is willing to bear per authentication session (in expectation).
We use O to denote the range of the SelPreds function (e.g., the space of all valid predicate sequences of length n − 1, where n denotes the maximum number of rounds of hashing for Reproduce ). We adopt the following notational conventions: Given a randomized algorithm like SelPreds we use o ← SelPreds(pwd) to denote a random sample from the distribution induced by an input pwd. If we fix the random input bits r then we will use o := SelPreds(x; r) to denote the deterministic result. We will use P to denote the space of all possible passwords that the user might select.
For a user with password pwdu and predicate sequence ou, the hash used by that user on the instance of a correct password is H
to denote the subset of outcomes which yield stopping time j for the password pwd. Finally, we will use the parameter > 0 to quantify the maximum amount of information leaked about a user's password by the output o ∈ O of the SelPreds function. For readers familiar with the notion of -differential privacy we remark that we use the same notation intentionally.
DESIGN OF THE MECHANISM
In the previous section we outlined the Client-CASH mechanism using the randomized algorithm SelPreds in a blackbox manner. We now examine the exact formulation of this algorithm.
Security Requirements
The probability that SelPreds(pwd) yields a particular outcome o ∈ O may depend on the input password pwd. Indeed, our goal is to introduce a cost asymmetry so that, in expectation, the stopping time S(pwd, o) for the correct password is less than stopping time S(pwd , o) for any incorrect passwords pwd = pwd. One natural way to achieve this asymmetry might be to define a family of predicates
for each password pwd ∈ P and j < n. Then SelPreds(pwd) might select a stopping time j at random from some distribution and set o = Pu 1 , . . . , Pu n−1 where Pu i = P pwd,j for each i < n. This solution could provide an extreme cost asymmetry. In particular, we would have S(pwd, o) = j for the correct password and with high probability we would have S(pwd , o) = n for all other passwords. Indeed, this solution is simply a reformulation of Boyen's [12] halting puzzles.
The downside to this solution is that it would enable an adversary to mount an offline attack using only state from the client (e.g., without breaching the authentication server) because the output o of SelPreds is stored on the client and this output would include the hash value H j k (pwd, su). In contrast to Boyen [12] , we will require the SelPreds function to satisfy a very stringent information theoretic security property. In particular, for every o ∈ O and for all pwd, pwd ∈ P with pwd = pwd , we will require that
Here, is the security parameter which upper bounds the amount of information about the user's password that is leaked by the outcome o. This requirement is exactly equivalent to the powerful notion of -differential privacy [19] . Intuitively, the probability that we produce a particular outcome o ∈ O cannot depend too much on particular password pwd that the user chose. Discussion. Differential privacy is an information theoretic guarantee, which holds even if the adversary has background knowledge about the user. The security guarantees are quite strong. In particular, let Attackz denote any attack that an adversary with background knowledge z might use after observing the outcome o from SelPreds(pwd) and let Bad ⊆ Range (Attackz) denote the set of outcomes that our user Alice would consider harmful. It is easy (e.g., see [20] ) to show that
Intuitively, the numerator represents the adversary's actual success rate and the denominator represents the adversary's success rate if the output of SelPreds were not even correlated with Alice's real password. Thus, the constraint implies that the probability the adversary's attack succeeds cannot greatly depend on the output of the SelPreds function.
Cost Requirements
Performing client-side key stretching requires computational resources on the client side. We will require that the amortized cost of hashing a password does not exceed the maximum amortized cost the user is willing to bear. 
where the expectation is taken over the randomness of the algorithm SelPreds. Thus, we require that
Symmetric Predicate Sets
In this section we show how to simplify the security and cost constraints from the previous sections by designing O with certain symmetric properties. In particular, we need to design the SelPreds algorithm in such a way that the cost constraint (eq. 2) is satisfied for all passwords pwd ∈ P, and we need to ensure that our security constraint (eq. 1) holds for all pairs of passwords pwd = pwd . Working with |P| 2 different security constraints is unwieldy. Thus, we need a way to simplify these requirements.
One natural way to simplify these requirements is to construct a symmetric O; that is, for all pwd, pwd ∈ P and for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, |O j,pwd |= |O j,pwd |. We stress that this restriction does not imply that the sets O j,pwd and O j,pwd are the same, simply that their sizes are the same. We will also require that ∀pwd, pwd ∈ P, ∀j ≤ n, Intuitively,pj denotes the probability that SelPreds(pwd) outputs o with stopping time S(pwd, o) = j. We will also write Pr[Ej] instead of Pr[E j,pwd ] = Oj ·pj because the value will be the same for all passwords pwd ∈ P.
Now the SelPreds algorithm can be completely specified by the valuespj for j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. It remains to construct a symmetric O. The construction of a symmetric O used in this work is simple we will focus on stopping predicates with the following form:
Theorem 1 says that we can use these predicates to construct a symmetric set O.
Theorem 1. Let integers 1, . . . , n−1 ≥ 2 be given and suppose that O = {P 0, 1 , . . . P 1 −1, 1 }× . . . × {P 0, n−1 ,. . ., P n−1 −1, n−1 }. Then O is symmetric, i.e. for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and for all pwd, pwd ∈ P we have |O j,pwd |= |O j,pwd |.
One of the primary advantages of using a symmetric O is that we can greatly reduce the number of security and cost constraints. Table 1 compares the security and cost constraints with and without symmetry. Without symmetry we had to satisfy separate cost constraints for all passwords pwd ∈ P. With symmetry we only have to satisfy one cost constraint. Similarly, with symmetry we only need to satisfy one security constraint for each i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} instead of multiple constraints for each pair of passwords pwd = pwd that the user might select. While the space of passwords may be very large, n, the number of rounds of hashing, will typically be quite small (e.g., in this paper n ∈ {2, 3}). See the full version of this paper for proofs of the statements in Table 1 .
In our analysis of Client-CASH we will focus on two simple symmetric constructions of O:
• "Two Round" Case: set n = 1 = 2 in Theorem 1 so O = {P0,2, P1,2}.
• "Three Round" Case: set n = 1 = 2 = 3 in Theorem 1 so O = {P0,3, P1,3, P2,3} 2 .
We do not rule out the possibility that other cases would yield even stronger results. However, we are already able to obtain significant reductions in the adversary's success rate with these simple cases. 
THE ADVERSARY MODEL
In this section we formalize the strategies that an offline adversary might adopt so that we can analyze the effectiveness of the Client-CASH mechanism against an offline adversary. In an online attack, the adversary must interact with and query the authentication server to have a password verified or rejected, and there are a variety of effective methods to deal with such an attack (e.g., a k-strikes policy). By contrast, the offline adversary we consider is limited only by the resources that he is willing to invest to crack the user's password. The adversary's goal is to maximize the odds that he cracks the user's password given a finite computational budget B. We will use P adv,B (resp. P det,B ) to denote the probability that the optimal offline adversary successfully cracks a password protected with Client-CASH (resp. deterministic key-stretching) with a budget B denoting the maximum number of times that the adversary is willing to compute H. To simplify notation we will often write P adv (resp. P det ) when B is clear from context. The Adversary's Knowledge. We consider an adversary who has breached the client and one of the third party authentication servers (e.g., LinkedIn) where the user has an account. This adversary has access to all code and data on the client and on a third party authentication server. Suppose for example that user u created account a with a password pwdu. The client will store the tuple (u, a, ou, su, n, O, ) and the third party authentication server will have some record of the derived password H S(pwdu,ou) k (pwdu, su). In our analysis we do not assume that the third party authentication server adopts proper password storage procedures like keystretching -this is the unfortunate reality for many authentication servers [10] . If the authentication server does apply key-stretching then the adversary's offline attack will be even more expensive.
Offline attack against the traditional mechanism.
We first analyze the adversary's success rate P det,B against a traditional deterministic key stretching algorithm with comparable cost to Client-CASH. In particular, let k = Csrv C H . Instead of adopting Client-CASH the adversary might instead use a deterministic key-stretching algorithm H k with the same cost. In this case the adversary could check at most B k passwords, and each password has probability 1 |P| of being the correct password. Thus,
Offline attack against Client-CASH.
We now consider the adversary's optimal success rate P adv,B against Client-CASH. While each password pwd ∈ P is chosen with equal probability, we might have different stopping times S (pwd, ou) for each password. The adversary can compute H k up to B k times so he can complete B/k rounds of hashing in total. For each password guess pwdg the adversary can decide how many rounds of hashing to complete for that particular guess. There are many different strategies that the adversary might adopt, and some may produce a larger probability of success than others. Of course the optimal adversary will never complete more rounds of hashing than necessary (e.g., if S(pwdg, o) = i then the adversary will never complete i + 1 rounds of guessing for guess pwdg).
It turns out that we can represent the optimal adversary's strategies as a vector of n numbers b = (b1, . . . , bn) ∈ R n where bi ∈ [0, min {1, k |P| /B}] denotes the fraction of the adversary's budget spent hashing passwords i'th round (see the full version of this paper for a more formal justification). Formally, given a symmetric set O from Theorem 1 we use FB ⊆ R n to denote the set of feasible strategies for the adversary
We require that bi+1 ≤ bi · i −1 i because the adversary can only hash a password pwdg in round i + 1 if he previously completed round i for the same password and the optimal adversary will not hash pwdg in round i +1 if S(pwdg, o) = i -for a random password the halting predicate will output 1 with probability 1/ i in the i'th round. Given a particular strategy b the adversary succeeds with probability Because the user selects passwords uniformly at random from the set P we might conjecture that the optimal adversary will follow the same strategy for every password guess (e.g., for some i ≤ n the optimal adversary will hash each guess pwdg for min{i, S(pwdg, o)} rounds before moving on to the next guess). This intuition turns out to be correct. Formally, Ai . = {b ∈ FB : ∀b ∈ FB, bi ≥ b i } denotes the set of strategies in which the adversary tries each password guess for min{i, S(pwdg, o)} rounds before giving up. Our next results states that for some i ≤ n the adversary will follow a strategy in Ai.
Theorem 2. Assume that O is constructed as in Theorem 1. The dominant adversary strategies are given by the collection of sets Ai = {b ∈ FB :
Ai. Then
Discussion. In our analysis of the adversary we assume that the user picks passwords uniformly at random from P. Thus, we can only recommend Client-CASH to users for whom this assumption holds. A large body of research has explored the security of user selected passwords (e.g., [28, 13, 32, 8] ), how users cope with multiple passwords [21] and how users respond to password restrictions [26, 6] . These results indicate that many users do not select their password uniformly at random -contrary to the assumption we made in our security analysis. However, several research results indicate that users are capable of remembering truly random system-assigned passwords with practice [3, 5, 11, 36] . Our assumption would hold for users who adopt the four random words strategy popularized by the web comic XKCD 5 or the password management strategies proposed by Blocki et al. [3] . Thus, we believe that this assumption could be reasonable for many the security conscious users who would adopt Client-CASH.
Two Round Strategies
In the two-round case we have F * = A1 ∪ A2 in Theorem 2, so it suffices to calculate these two sets. We have A2 = If b = (1, 0) then, using the fact that O1 = 1, we have
Thus, working out each case for b ∈ F * Theorem 2 simplifies to:
Three Round Strategies
In the three-round case we have F * = A1 ∪ A2 ∪ A3 in Theorem 2, so it suffices to calculate these three sets. To bound P adv,B we note that it is sufficient to find the extremal points of each region since the adversary's objective function is linear in the bi's. Letting Ai denote the extremal points of Ai, we thus have For example, if b = 3 5 , 2 5 , 0 then, using the fact that O1 = 3, O2 = 2 and j = 3, we have 
THE EXPONENTIAL MECHANISM
In this section we show how to construct the SelPreds function so that it satisfies our security and cost constraints (equations 1 and 2). Our construction is based on the Exponential Mechanism of McSherry and Talwar [29] , a powerful tool from the differential privacy literature. We demonstrate that this mechanism is feasible and that it leads to a significant reduction in the adversary's success rate. In particular the exponential mechanism can reduce the adversary's success rate by up to 12% when n, the maximum number of hashing rounds, is two and by up to 18% when n = 3.
Constructing SelPreds via the Exponential Mechanism
To define the SelPreds function it suffices to specify the probability of each outcome o ∈ O given an input password pwd ∈ P. Consider the utility function U (pwd, o) . Intuitively, given a fixed password pwd the exponential mechanism assigns a higher probability to outcomes o with shorter stopping times S(pwd, o). We can ensure that our cost constraints are satisfied by tuning the parameter k (the number of hash iterations per round). After and O have been fixed we will set k to be the maximum integer such that:
where the left hand side is a constant.
Observe that whenever O is symmetric it is possible to precompute the stopping time probabilitiespj
Thus, to sample from SelPredsexp, (pwd) it suffices to sample the stopping time j, compute H jk (pwd, su) and sample uniformly at random from the set O j,pwd .
Theorem 3 states that the exponential mechanism above satisfies our desired security constraint. Theorem 3 is similar to the general result of McSherry and Talwar [29] , which would imply that our mechanism SelPredsexp, satisfies the security constraint with security parameter 2 . In our particular setting we can exploit symmetry (e.g., |O j,pwd | = |O j,pwd |) to obtain a tighter bound with security parameter . 
Analysis of the Exponential Mechanism
We will use GB . = P det,B −P adv,B to denote the gains from adopting Client-CASH (i.e., the reduction in the probability that the adversary cracks the password). Recall that P adv,B (resp. P det,B ) denotes the probability that the optimal offline adversary successfully cracks a password protected with Client-CASH (resp. deterministic key-stretching) with a budget B. Figure 1a and 1b plots GB as a function of B for various values of the security parameter . Theorem 2 allows us to compute P adv,B and GB efficiently.
Two-Round Exponential Mechanism
Note that when n = 2, O = {P0,2, P1,2} so (O1, O2) = (1, 1). Thus for a fixed value of , we can define the exponential mechanism as follows: Although we have an inequality in the last equation, we emphasize that k is determined to be the maximum integer such that the inequality holds, as described in §6.1. Since k is large, and thus marginal changes in Csrv k·C H are small, we assume for simplicity thatp1 + 2p2 = Csrv k·C H and round k downwards if it is not an integer.
Three-Round Exponential Mechanism
When n = 3, O = {P0,3, P1,3, P2,3} × {P0,3, P1,3, P2,3} so (O1, O2, O3) = (3, 2, 4) . Thus for a fixed , we can define the exponential mechanism as follows: 
Discussion.
Our analysis shows that exponential mechanism can be used to reduce the percentage of passwords breached by an optimal offline adversary. When B = k |P| we will always have P det,B = 1. Thus, we expect that the gain GB will decrease monotonically after this point which is indeed what we observe in the plots. In the two round case we always had positive gain (e.g., for all B ≥ 0 we had GB > 0 for every value of that we tried). In the three round case we always had GB > 0 whenever < 2.3. Observe that GB does not always increase monotonically as we increase (e.g., as we relax the security constraint). In both the two round and the three round case GB increases monotonically with as long as ≤ 0.5, but after this the graphs intersect indicating that different values of are better than others for different B when the exponential mechanism is used.
We note that the exponential mechanism does not incorporate any information about the adversary's budget B. The exponential mechanism SelPredsexp, ≈2.3 with the largest value of performs poorly against smaller budgets B, but it provided the optimal defense in two rounds against an adversary with larger budgets. If we know B in advance then we can often improve our construction of the SelPreds function (see §7).
Client-CASH OPTIMIZATION
In this section we show how to optimize the SelPreds function under the assumption that the size of the password space |P| and the adversary's budget B are known in advance. This may not be an unreasonable assumption for many users. For example, Bonneau and Schechter estimated that for the SHA256 hash function CH = $7×10 −15 [11] , and Symantec reports that passwords generally sell for $4 − $30 on the black market. Thus, we might reasonably expect that a rational adversary will have a budget B ≤ 30 7×10 −15 = 4.29 × 10 15 . If the user selects passwords uniformly at random then it is reasonable to assume that |P| is known. For example, we might have |P|= 10 12 for users who memorize three random person-action-object stories and use the associated action-object pairs for their password [3, 5] .
Given a symmetric set O of outcomes our goal is to find probability valuesp1, . . . ,pn and a parameter k which min-(a) Two round exponential mechanism.
(b) Three round exponential mechanism.
(c) Two round optimal mechanism.
(d) Three round optimal mechanism. imize the adversary's success rate P adv,B in the event of an offline attack. We must choose these values in a way that satisfy our security and cost constraints (Table 1) . This goal is stated formally as Optimization Goal 1.
Constraints (1) and (2) specify that thepi values must define a valid probability distribution and constraints (3) and (6) are the security and cost constraints from Table  1 . Constraint (4) states that k, the parameter controling the cost of the underlying hash function H k in each round of Client-CASH, can be at most Csrv C H . Otherwise it would be impossible to satisfy our cost constraint because just a single round of hash iteration would cost more than Csrv. Finally, constraint (5) implies that we must minimize P adv,B subject to the assumption that the adversary responds with his optimal strategy (see Theorem 2 ) .
We note that, for a fixed value of k, Optimization Goal 1 becomes a linear program. Thus, we can solve Optimization Goal 1 efficiently by solving the resulting linear program for each value of k ∈ {1, . . . , Csrv C H } and taking the best solution. 
Figure 2:
Comparison of the percent reduction in cracked passwords GB between the optimal distribution (blue) and the exponential distribution (orange) for as a function of B with a normalizing factor of 1 k |P| = C H Csrv |P| for various values of . The results for the two round optimal mechanism is shown in (a), while the three round optimal mechanism is shown in (b). Figures 1c and 1d compare the optimal Client-CASH defense to the cost-equivalent deterministic key-stretching defense. We use the same symmetric predicate sets O as in previous sections (two-round and three-round). The full version of this paper [7] includes additional figures comparing the exponential mechanism and the optimal mechanism directly.
Analysis

Discussion.
Our results demonstrate that it is often possible to obtain even greater reductions in the adversary's success rate if we know the budget B in advance. For example, in the three round case n = 3 we can reduce the adversary's rate of success by as much as GB = 21%. However, we note that the solution to Optimization Goal 1 may not be optimal if the estimate of the adversary's budget B is wrong. Thus, if the user is uncertain about the adversary's budget he may better off adopting the exponential mechanism.
Unlike the exponential mechanism we expect for the gain GB to increase monotonically with larger because we only loosen constraint (3) . This is what we observe in Figures 1c  and 1d . We also note that when the adversary's budget B exceeds k |P| we have P det,B = 1. Thus, GB must decrease monotonically after this point because P adv,B will increase monotonically with B.
PRACTICAL GUIDELINES
All the Client-CASH mechanisms examined give reductions in the percentage of passwords breached by an optimal offline adversary. We also make the following recommendations of when a user should use a certain mechanism.
Two Rounds vs. Three Rounds. Figures 3a and 3b compare the two-round Client-CASH mechanism mechanism to the three-round Client-CASH mechanism. Based on the results in Figure 3 , we recommend using three rounds of hashing in general. In particular, the three round mechanisms tend to achieve greater gains in security. The one possible exception is when the adversary's budget is smaller, but we are uncertain about the adversary's exact budget. In this one case the two round exponential mechanism might be the right choice 6 . Against adversaries with a larger budget the three round mechanism is the clear winner -note that the gains remain positive for much larger values of the adversary budget B.
Information Leakage.
In general we would recommend that any implementation use ≤ 2.08 so that the outcome o leaks at most 3 bits of information about the user's password. We note that if the adversary breaches only the client then he would still need to complete a brute-force search over all passwords pwd ∈ P to extract this information from o. In our demo implementation we selected security parameter = 1.609 so that the outcome o of SelPreds will leak at most 2.32 bits of information about the user's password. Future versions might help the client to tune himself. We selected = 1.609 because it yielded the highest reductions against an adversary with a larger budget B.
Adversary Budget.
If we have an accurate estimation of the adversary's budget B then we should compute the SelPreds distribution using our algorithm from §7 before implementing Client-CASH. However, if this estimation is not precise then it may be better to use the exponential mechanism from §6.
Password Distribution.
We only show how to optimize Client-CASH under the assumption that users choose passwords uniformly at random. We hope that future work will extend this analysis Figure 3 : Comparison of the percent reduction in passwords between two-round mechanisms (blue) and three-round mechanisms (orange) as a function of B with a normalizing factor of 1 k |P| = C H Csrv |P| for various values of . The results for the exponential mechanism are shown in (a), while the optimal mechanism is shown in (b).
to more general password distributions. Until then Client-CASH should only be adopted by users who select uniformly random passwords from some space.
Amortization of Costs.
Our guarantee that the client's computational costs during authentication at most Csrv only holds in expectation. Of course the user may get unlucky when we run SelPreds(pwd) and end up with the maximum stopping time S(pwd, o) = n. We note that if key-stretching was performed by a trusted third party (e.g., LastPass) then these costs could be amortized over different users. If key-stretching is only performed on the user's local computer then we could give an unlucky user the option to speed up the key-stretching process by memorizing an additional random character and appending it to his password (e.g., see [11] ).
Demo Implementation
A demo implementation of the three round exponential Client-CASH mechanism is available on client-cash.github.io 7 . We implemented our algorithms in Javascript so the keystretching is done locally by the user's web browser. In our implementation we used k = 100, 000 iterations of the SHA256 hash function H. Thus, Client-CASH perform between 100, 000 and 300, 000 iterations of the SHA256 hash function to derive our final password. We selected n = 3 because the exponential mechanism performs better with n = 3 rounds of hashing (see Figure 3a ).
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we have introduced Client-CASH as a novel client-side key stretching mechanism which gives better security guarantees than traditional key-stretching procedures.We 7 The current demo implementation does not permanently save state for future authentication sessions though we anticipate adding this functionality soon. make several contributions. First, we show how to introduce randomness into a client-side key stretching algorithms through the use of halting predicates which are selected randomly at the time of account creation. Second, we formalize the problem of finding the optimal running time distribution subject to certain cost constraints for the client and certain security constrains on the halting predicates. Finally, we demonstrate that Client-CASH can reduce the adversary's success rate by up to 21% ( in the n = 3 round case). These results demonstrate the promise of the Client-CASH mechanism. In the future we hope that researchers will extend our analysis of Client-CASH to handle non-uniform password distributions. We also speculate that it may be possible to obtain even larger reductions in the adversary's success rate by using predicate sequences O with more rounds of hashing n > 3. Future work might extend our analysis of Client-CASH to explore this possibility.
